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Resumo
Todos os circuitos integrados, de certo modo, são vulneráveis a diversos ataques para diferentes
fins, tais como a obtenção de um acesso privilegiado a recursos não licenciados ou para reverse
engineering. Muitas vezes, as portas de teste e debug têm de ser mantidas operacionais, propor-
cionando consequentemente uma maneira de aceder ao chip. Essas portas são projetadas para
executar diferentes tarefas antes do circuito integrado chegar ao mercado, para maximizar a qual-
idade através da análise de respostas particulares a vetores de teste aplicados a blocos de circuitos
especificados. Assim, as operações de teste durante as diferentes fases de fabricação do circuito
integrado implicam o acesso a funcionalidades profundas. Estas funcionalidades estão normal-
mente escondidas de um utilizador normal do sistema, e para que o hacker consiga ter acesso
às instruções não documentadas, ele ou ela necessita de atuar nas portas de uma forma diferente
de um utilizador legítimo, de maneira a tentar descobrir as funções escondidas e em seguida, ter
acesso a todos os recursos do circuito integrado se bem sucedido.
Para a segurança de circuitos integrados, diversos métodos e algoritmos foram já propostos,
por exemplo, o acesso por palavra-chave ou encriptação de dados. No entanto, também têm sido
bem sucedidas estratégias complexas de ataque que são capazes de superar esses mecanismos de
defesa. Novos e robustos mecanismos de segurança são, por isso, sempre necessários.
Este trabalho segue essas diretrizes e é focado na implementação e modificação de um sistema
de segurança em hardware (FPGA), que assinalará se um ataque está a ser realizado. A ideia
principal é construir um classificador que monitoriza o sistema, segue a atividade no circuito
integrado e decide, baseado no comportamento, se uma determinada utilização é legítima ou não.
Desse modo, um ataque segue um procedimento de erro que vai criar um padrão de actividade
diferente dos padrões normais, o que por sua vez permite a detecção.
Assim, a previsão é efetuada por um classificador constituído por uma floresta de árvores de
decisão que são treinadas utilizando técnicas de bagging. O sistema de deteção é composto por 4
blocos principais e está em constante interação com o JTAG. O sistema final está implementado
numa Xilinx Zynq-7000 ZC706.
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Abstract
All integrated circuits (IC), in some extent, are vulnerable to numerous attacks for different pur-
poses, such as getting privileged access to non licensed features or for reverse engineering. Often
the testing and debugging ports are kept operational, providing a way to access the chip. These
ports are designed to perform several different tasks before the IC reaches the market, to max-
imize quality through the analysis of particular responses to testing vectors applied to specified
circuit blocks. Thus, testing operations during the different phases of the IC fabrication implies
accessing deep core functionalities. These functionalities are normally hidden from a normal user
of the system, and in order for the hacker to get insight of undocumented access instructions and
functionalities, he or she needs to actuate on the ports differently from a legitimate user, to try and
to discover those hidden functions, then gaining access to all the resources of the IC if successful.
For the security of integrated circuits, several methods and algorithms are already in place,
for instance, password-based access or data encryption. However, there also have been successful
complex attacking strategies that are capable of overcoming such defense mechanisms. New and
robust methods of security are then always on demand.
This work follows these guidelines and is focused on the implementation and modification of a
security scheme in hardware (FPGA) that will flag if an attack is being performed. The main idea
is to build a classifier that monitors the system and tracks the activity in the IC and then decides,
based on its behavior, whether an utilization in a given moment is legitimate or not. Thereby,
an attack follows an error procedure that will create an activity pattern distinct from the normal
patterns, which then allows the detection.
Thus, the prediction is made by a random forest classifier that is trained using bagging tech-
niques. The detection system is composed by 4 main blocks and it is in constant interaction with
the JTAG. The final system is implemented in a Xilinx Zynq-7000 ZC706.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents the motivation, challenges and objectives of this work. It also describes the
structure of the document.
1.1 Motivation
The Joint Test Action Group (JTAG), also named IEEE 1149.1, is the standard for test access port
and boundary scan architecture. It is widely used for the testing, debugging and failure analysis of
integrated circuits (ICs), since it dramatically improves the testability and reduces the testing time
compared to other testing methods [1]. However, the high testability provided by the JTAG may
cause security problems in the chip. Since it needs to be left operational in order to be used, it in-
evitably provides a backdoor that can be used for reverse engineering purposes or to dump critical
data. These backdoors are undocumented functions that grant access to areas of the chip normally
not directly readable by the end-user. Thereby, it is possible to perform several different attacks
through scan-based side-channel attacks to retrieve secret keys, for example, of cryptographic
chips (DES and AES). Besides this, the user-defined functions introduce even more backdoors,
and since that reverse engineering techniques are becoming more common and powerful, the chip
stays even more susceptible to attacks.
There are several methods and mechanisms to protect the JTAG, and some of them will be
presented in this document, but each one of them has its own set of drawbacks. For instance, the
password of an authentication scheme can leak, or the original JTAG can be modified, requiring
additional hardware to support lock and unlocks mechanisms or even the network availability that
is needed for a server-based authentication. However, since the attacks consist in different actions
and patterns compared to the normal actions that occur in the integrated circuit, Machine Learning
concepts such as Decision Trees or Random Forests, can be used for the detection of these attacks.
Therefore, in this work, a security system is defined and implemented in an FPGA, which is able
to monitor the activity of the JTAG, track user behavior, detect illegitimate accesses and learn the
patterns in order to become more accurate and efficient [2].
1
2 Introduction
1.2 Objectives
The work consists in an hardware implementation and modification of the security system pro-
posed in [2], replacing the decision tree with a random forest which is an ensemble of decision
trees. The final goal is to have the complete system working properly in a Xilinx Zynq-7000 All
Programmable SoC ZC706, with the JTAG included, taking into account the restricted timing con-
straints. Thereby, to achieve this, the work was divided into four big steps, each one containing
several tasks.
First, it was necessary to study all the necessary background for the implementation and to
understand the concept behind the algorithm. The concept of JTAG, which is the port that can
provide undesired access to the integrated circuit, was carefully studied as well as some concepts
of Machine Learning that were used in this work, since it is based on a learning system that makes
predictions based on previous patterns. It was also necessary to define the tools to use and to be
familiarized with them.
The second step consisted in the simulation of random forests using MATLAB, in order to
train them using the appropriate data set for the algorithm, which contains information extracted
from JTAG programs. This part also included the determination of the optimal number of trees for
the forest.
The third step is related to the hardware design and implementation of the system. It is focused
on an on-chip classifier, which started from a single Decision Tree followed by the Random Forest.
The random forest classifier was designed following two different approaches and both of them
were implemented on the FPGA. The other three modules of the system were also synthesized
individually in order to be integrated in the complete system.
Finally, the JTAG TAP Controller was integrated with the rest of the system. The entire system
was simulated, synthesized, implemented in the FGPA and optimized achieving the final goal of
this work.
1.3 Challenges
The system that is being implemented, presented in March 2015, is a recent and innovative work.
It is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first work that uses an on-chip learning-based
approach to ensure the security of the JTAG, without modifying the IEEE 1149.1. It uses the
OpenSPARC T2 [3] as a platform to describe a typical JTAG behavior and it achieves high accu-
racy in detecting the illegitimate accesses to the chip.
Besides being an extremely interesting system, implementing it in a real hardware such as
an FPGA makes it even more challenging and innovative, since there are only a few defense
mechanisms for JTAG and integrated circuits that are implemented in a real board.
One of the biggest challenges of this work is meeting the timing requirements of the JTAG.
Since this is a system that monitors the JTAG behavior in real time, it cannot miss any input bit
or any instruction. New instructions are always being triggered and the on-chip classifier needs
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to classify each one of them in time. Therefore, the implementation should be able to run under
a clock frequency faster than the normal JTAG frequency. Accordingly, two different clocks need
to be synchronized properly.
Another challenge is to find the optimal number of decision trees for the random forest. On
one hand, several trees perform better and the error of classification is reduced. On the other hand,
the trees need to be stored on chip, and therefore a large number of trees requires much more
memory space.
In summary, the challenges of this work mainly involve the speed/frequency of the classifier,
synchronization between the main system and the JTAG TAP Controller and, area overhead and
power consumption that are commonly considered in hardware implementation.
1.4 Structure
The following chapters are organized as below.
Chapter 2 contains a brief description of the background of JTAG and Machine Learning.
The JTAG section starts with an overview and description of main concepts, followed by the
JTAG interface signals, registers and TAP Controller. The Machine Learning section also has an
overview of what is machine learning and which typical prediction approaches exist, and then a
more specific subsections focused on the Decision Trees and Random Forests. This subsection
of Decision Trees also contains some hardware implementations. Finally, this chapter concludes
with the state of the art about Integrated Circuit Security, presenting some possible attacks, defense
mechanisms and solutions developed so far.
Chapter 3 has two main parts, although it contains four sections. The first part contains a
detailed description of the system that is being implemented, referring its normal operation, how
the attacks are detected, its complete architecture, with a brief description of each module, and
finally a comparison with other existing defense mechanisms. The second part, corresponding to
section 3.4, presents the training of the trees and how the optimal number of trees for the random
forest was found.
Chapter 4 starts with a brief description of the FPGA that is used in this work, presenting its
components and resources. However, this chapter is focused on the hardware implementation of
the modules of the system, presenting how each module works, how they are implemented and
which resources they utilize. It has a main focus on the classifier, which is the essential part of the
project and was implemented following two different approaches.
Chapter 5 presents the synthesis of the JTAG TAP Controller module, the integration of all
the modules and the synthesis of the complete system. It also describes the interface between the
processing system and the programmable logic of the FPGA, how the inputs are applied and the
outputs are read. Moreover, it contains the communication with the computer, the results of the
final implementation and a discussion of the results.
Finally, chapter 6 presents the conclusions of this work and future steps that may be taken to
improve the current system and integrate it in real life.
4 Introduction
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Since this work is related with JTAG, by controlling the illegitimate access to this port using
Machine Learning, a brief background on both of these topics is given in sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Also, in section 2.3, it is provided a summary of the work done in the area of attacks and defense
mechanisms for integrated circuits.
2.1 Joint Test Action Group (JTAG)
2.1.1 Overview
The in-circuit testing was done with a mechanism that probes the backs of the boards with nails,
called bed-of-nails. However, with the constant miniaturization of device packing and the de-
velopment of surface-mounted packaging, this mechanism became obsolete. Thus, IEEE 1149.1
Standard Test Access Port and Boundary-Scan Architecture [4], most known as JTAG (Joint Test
Action Group), appeared in 1990 as a new solution to the in-circuit testing. Essentially, the best
advantage offered by the boundary-scan technology is the ability to set and read values of the pins
without the need of a direct physical access.
A JTAG enabled device, which is shown in Figure 2.1, must have a serial scan path, known
as the Boundary-Scan Register (BSR), which consists of a parallel-in, parallel-out shift register
between the core logic of the device and the pins. This Boundary-Scan Register is an internal
hardware that provides a register at each pin position, which is made of a sequence of cells, known
as Boundary-Scan Cells (BSC). It is possible to load the boundary-scan cell for a particular input,
shifting a pattern into the boundary-scan register, and using the value at that pin to drive the system
circuitry [1].
Besides the debugging and testing part, JTAG also allows a programmer device to transfer data
into the internal non-volatile device memory. Hence, some of these device programmers have both
purposes – debugging and programming.
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Figure 2.1: JTAG Device Structure from [1]
2.1.2 Interface Signals
The TAP Controller, that will be presented in section 2.1.4, has the following signals to support
the operation of the boundary scan: [5]
• Test Clock (TCK): which synchronizes the internal state machine operations and must
be capable of operating at an independent clock rate from the system clock rate, asyn-
chronously from the system circuitry;
• Test Data In (TDI): which is the serial input to the boundary register. It is sampled at the
rising edge of the TCK when the internal state machine is in the correct state;
• Test Data Out (TDO): which is the serial output from the boundary register and is valid on
the falling edge of the TCK when the internal state machine is in the correct state;
• Test Mode Select (TMS): which causes the testing hardware to enter various testing modes;
• Test Reset (TRST): which is optional and, when available, can reset the state machine of
the TAP controller. It is generally an active-low signal.
2.1.3 Registers
Boundary scan has two types of associated registers: instruction registers and data registers (two
or more). The Instruction Register (IR) holds the current instruction and its content determines to
which of the data registers the signals should be passed.
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Figure 2.2: TAP Controller State Diagram from [1]
The Data Registers (DR) are the Boundary Scan Register, the BYPASS register and the ID-
CODES register. The first, as already explained, is the main testing data register and is used to
move data to and from the I/O (Input/Output) pins of a device. The BYPASS is a single-bit register
that passes directly the information from the TDI to the TDO, which can be extremely useful when
many boundary registers of all components on the PCB are chained together into one long shift
register and we want to ignore some of them that are not involved in the current test [1]. Finally,
the IDCODES contains the ID code and revision number for the device.
2.1.4 Test Access Port (TAP) Controller
The Test Access Port (TAP) Controller is the JTAG Interface and implements a 16-state finite state
machine that recognizes the boundary scan communication protocol and controls the operation of
the boundary scan test hardware through internal signals. Its transitions are controlled by the TMS
signal and it controls the behavior of the JTAG. The path on the left sets or retrieves information
from a data register, while the path on the right is responsible for the instruction registers. The
TAP Controller state diagram is shown in Figure 2.2.
Some of these states play an extremely important role in this work since they need to be
analyzed to extract some features, as will be further explained. Thereby, a short description of
them is given in this section [6].
The Test-Logic-Reset enables the normal operation of the IC, disabling the test logic. The
Run-Test-Idle enables the test logic in the IC only if specific instructions are present. The Select
DR-Scan state controls if the system enters in the left path (of the data register) or if it goes to the
Select IR-Scan while the Select IR-Scan controls if the system enters in the path of the instruction
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register. If not, the system goes back to the Test-Logic-Reset state. Capture-IR loads a pattern of
specific values when a rising edge of the TCK is detected and the Shift-IR connects the instruction
register between the TDI and the TDO. The pattern loaded in the Capture-IR state starts to be
shifted in this state. Exit1-IR simply controls if the system should enter in the Pause-IR state or
move to the Update-IR state and the Pause-IR state, as the name indicates, stops temporarily the
shifting of the instruction register. The Exit2-IR decides if the system goes back to the Shift-IR
state or to the Update-IR. In the Update-IR state the current instruction is already defined. This
state is one of the most important for the whole implementation. Capture-DR loads data into the
data registers that are chosen by the current instruction. Finally, the other 5 states do not need
further explanation since they are very similar to the states of the IR that were already defined.
2.1.5 Instructions
For a device to be considered compliant with the IEEE 1149.1 Standard, a set of instructions [1]
must be available, such as:
• BYPASS: This instruction is used to bypass the boundary scan chain with a one-bit bypass
register. It allows the testing of other devices in the JTAG chain without any unnecessary
overhead;
• EXTEST: The EXTEST instruction is used mainly to test off-chip circuits and board-level
interconnections independently of the chip. To do this, the signals coming into the chip in
the boundary scan register are captured and the signals coming out from the chip from the
boundary scan register are driven;
• SAMPLE/PRELOAD: The SAMPLE/PRELOAD instruction is used to obtain a snapshot
of the normal component input and output signals and store them in the first of the two
master-slave flip-flops in the boundary scan ring;
Other common instructions available can be INTEST, IDCODE, RUNBIST, CLAMP, USER-
CODE or HIGHZ, but these will not be described in this brief background chapter.
2.1.6 Summary
Since nowadays it is no longer possible to test the majority of the circuits exclusively with the bed-
of-nails mechanism, boundary scan is becoming absolutely essential for the electronic testing. It
supports external testing with an automatic test equipment, boundary scan chain reconfiguration
and response compressor for built-in-self-test (BIST) [1]. JTAG is considered the most widely
used device test mechanism [6] and allows the reduction of costs, improves the product quality
and increases the speed of the development. Despite being an extremely powerful tool which
incorporates testing and debugging capabilities, as already referred in this document, JTAG’s fea-
tures can be used and explored by hackers to gain access to the chip [7].
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2.2.1 Overview
Machine Learning draws on ideas from a large set of disciplines such as artificial intelligence,
probability and statistics, information theory, control theory, computational complexity, among
others, and addresses the question of how to build computer programs that improve their per-
formance at some task through experience. There are several machine learning algorithms, with
numerous different applications. These algorithms learn from data and make predictions and de-
cisions without following only specific instructions previously programmed [8].
The main idea behind Machine Learning is to learn from data, using a predictor and having a
prediction in the end. This predictor is deterministic, it is a function and basically it receives the
inputs and computes the predicted output values of those inputs. It is the "secret" of the Machine
Learning, and it should be built with training examples and learning algorithms. The training
examples/inputs should be pairs of x, which is the input and f*(x), which is what should be seen
as an output for that x input.
There are different types of prediction tasks, such as: classification, regression and clustering
[9]. Classification is a way of classifying different objects/inputs based on some labels assigned
to a few other inputs. Starting from a collection of objects with some labels already assigned,
the predictor in this classification task divides the space into two (or more) parts, defining an
imaginary line splitting these two parts, called decision boundary. That line is the function that
predicts the results, based on which side the input falls. The most important thing about the
classification is that the decision boundary depends on the labels. If the same set of inputs is
taken, with different labels, a distinct decision boundary will be specified. Figure 2.3 shows an
example of classification, where only some "M" and "F" labels are assigned as initialization, and
then the algorithm assigns the others, whether they fall in the M or F side of the decision boundary
[10].
Figure 2.3: Example of classification task, taken from [10]
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Figure 2.4: Example of regression task, taken from [10]
Regression is a way of predicting outputs based on different objects with numbers assigned
to some of them. The prediction needs to assign numbers to the unassigned objects, by learning
with the numbers already assigned. Figure 2.4 shows an example of regression, where only some
numbers were assigned initially, and then the algorithm assigns the others based on the given ones.
Both of the methods, classification and regression, are methods of the so called supervised
learning because something very specific (such as examples of desired results) is given, that allows
the algorithm to learn.
On the other hand, Clustering is an unsupervised learning task, since no examples are given,
only the data set. The goal is to discover subpopulations inside the population. Clustering is very
useful to detect objects that are not usual but for some reason are inside the population. By dividing
the population into subgroups, if any object is an outlier, it will stand alone, without association to
any group. This can be seen in Figure 2.5 that shows a clustering example with an outlier.
Although there are several algorithms for machine learning, for instance support vector ma-
chines, k-nearest neighbors, etc., this document and the next subsection will focus on Decision
Trees and Random Forests since this work is based on trees’ concepts.
2.2.2 Decision Trees
Decision tree learning is one of the most widely used and practical predictive models. These trees
can also be represented by several if-else structures. Since the decision trees (DT) are included
in the supervised learning, they can have two main types: classification trees or regression trees.
There are many decision-tree algorithms, but the most important ones are ID3, C4.5 and CART.
The concept of CART, which stands for Classification and Regression Trees, was introduced
by Breiman to refer to both of the trees, classification and regression [11].
Decision trees allow the classification of examples by sorting them down the tree, from the
root to a leaf node which provides the final classification [12]. Each node represents a test of one
or more attributes of the target function, and each branch descending from that node is one of the
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Figure 2.5: Example of clustering task, taken from [10]
possible values for the attribute. Therefore, the classification of an instance starts with the testing
of the attribute at the root node of the tree and then moving down with the possible values for that
attribute [8].
The tests represented by the nodes, can be written, generally, as a function f of n attributes:
f (A1,A2, . . . ,An) = 0 (2.1)
The nodes are continuously split until a pure set is reached. A pure set is a set of attributes
in which the final result of its branches is the same. For example, Figure 2.6 shows a simple
decision tree to decide whether a person plays tennis, or not, according to the weather. Looking
at the figure, one can see that if the weather is "Overcast", that person will definitely play, so this
represents a pure set. On the other hand, if the weather is "Sunny", the result depends on the
Humidity, so "Sunny" is not a pure set. However, "Sunny" and "Humidity Normal" is already a
pure set.
In order to know which attribute should be split, the "purity" of the split should be evaluated.
So, the goal is to have more certain answers (Yes or No in the example presented) after the split.
However, it is not possible to use probabilities to measure this, even with conditional probability
(probability of getting a certain value, knowing one subset already), because it has to be symmetric,
which means that a subset full of "Yes" answers is as pure as a subset full of "No" answers. Hence,
there is a way to measure the uncertainty of a class in a subset of examples, called Entropy, given
by:
Entropy(S) =−p log2 p−n log2 n (2.2)
where p is the percentage of positive examples in the subset S, and n is the percentage of negative
examples.
Equation 2.2 should be interpreted in terms of a "fractional" number of bits. So, the main
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Figure 2.6: Decision Tree for the decision of playing tennis from [8]
question is, how many bits are necessary to tell if a certain item that belongs to the subset is
positive or negative? If the subset is pure, the number of bits needed is zero. On the other hand, if
the subset is 100 % uncertain (number of positives equal to the number of negatives) the number
of bits should be one, since it is either positive or negative. Finally, for cases with less certainty
than a pure set, but higher certainty than a 100 % uncertain subset, the result of the entropy will be
a number between zero and one, and that is why this can be interpreted in a "fractional" number
of bits.
Figure 2.7 shows the function of entropy as the proportion of positive examples (represented
by p+ in the x-axis) varies between 0 and 1. Equation 2.2 stands only for the case when the
classification is boolean. If the attribute can take n different values, then the entropy would be
computed as:
Entropy(S) =
n
∑
i=1
−pi log2 pi (2.3)
where pi is the proportion of the subset S that belongs to the class i.
Since the entropy tells how pure a subset is, then it is necessary to aggregate the information
from various subsets. In the weather example there are three different subsets, each one with its
own purity value. Thus, the information gain of an attribute A relative to a collection of examples
S is given by [8]:
Gain(S,A) = Entropy(S)− ∑
v∈Values(A)
|Sv|
|S| Entropy(Sv) (2.4)
where Sv is the subset of S where the attribute A has the value v, and Values(A) is the set of all
possible values for the attribute A. So, the value of Gain(S,A) is the expected drop in entropy after
split, which in other words means the number of bits that it is possible to gain, if the attribute A is
chosen as the attribute to split on. Therefore, to have the most certainty possible, the attribute with
highest gain should be selected as the attribute to split.
There are also some techniques that allows the construction of more than one tree:
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Figure 2.7: Entropy function varying the proportion of positive examples from 0 to 1 from [8]
• Bagging Trees take bootstrap samples of examples and trains a classifier on each sample,
and the classifier votes are combined by majority voting; [13]
• Random Forests, which uses a defined number of decision trees, in order to improve the
classification rate; [14]
• Boosted Trees can be used for both classification and regression types and the idea is to
boost the performance of a "weak" classifier by using it within an ensemble structure; [15]
• Rotation Forest consists in splitting the feature set into N subsets, apply principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) on each subset and then reassembling a new extracte feature set.
[16]
2.2.2.1 Hardware Implementation
A straightforward approach for an hardware implementation of a decision tree can be the imple-
mentation of each node as an independent module as proposed in [17]. Despite being a simple
implementation, it has the disadvantage of waiting until a classification of an instance is com-
pleted, before applying a new instance.
Based on the equivalences between DTs and threshold networks, Bermak and Martinez pro-
posed a faster implementation, since the propagation of the signals only goes through two levels,
independently of the number of levels of the decision tree [18].
Since these two realizations proposed above require a considerable number of hardware re-
sources, for instance, the number of node modules to be realized needs to be equal to the number
of nodes in the decision tree, Struharik tried to find some architectures that besides the reduction
of the hardware complexity, could also achieve high throughput [19]. In this approach, to classify
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an instance, only one node per level needs to be evaluated. Hence, the number of modules for the
realization is equal to the depth of the tree, instead of the total number of nodes of the decision
tree. This way, it is enough to have only one universal node module per each level, and that is
why this architecture is called Single Module per Level (SMpL). Thus, this architecture consists
of N pipeline stages, being N the depth of the decision tree being realized. Also, it is possible to
reduce the computational time by doing a parallelization in the evaluation of the test in each node.
With this parallelization, the throughput of the SMpL architecture is one instance per clock cycle,
instead of one instance per n+1 clock cycles, if the evaluation is sequential. The author called
this architecture Single Module per Level Parallel (SMpL-P). This SMpL-P architecture increases
a bit the hardware complexity. On the other hand, the author defined another architecture called
Universal Node (UN) for when the classification speed is not a problem, being even more pos-
sible the reduction of the complexity of the hardware, by assigning a single universal node that
can evaluate the whole tree (by evaluating each tree node). This architecture consists of only one
programmable node where one of the modules is the control unit for the perfect operation of the
system. It is necessary not only to load the attribute values of the next instance to classify, but
also to classify the current instance. As the Single Module per Level, it is also possible to do a
parallelization in the evaluation test in the universal node, reducing the time of computation from
n+1 clock cycles to one clock cycle, which increases the classification speed by a factor of n+1.
This architecture was called Universal Node Parallel (UN-P).
2.2.3 Random Forests
A random decision forest is an ensemble of randomly trained decision trees. Its model is charac-
terized by a specific number of components.
The accuracy of the classification was significantly improved by this growing of an ensemble
of trees and letting them vote for the most popular class. In order to train each tree, it is necessary
to generate random vectors that can supervise the growth of each one of them. One example,
proposed in 1996 by Breiman, is bagging, where examples are chosen, randomly, from the training
set. [20]
Later, in 1998, Dietterich proposed the random split selection [21], where at each node the
split is selected randomly among the K best splits. In 1990, Breiman randomized the outputs
in the original training set to generate new training sets. Also, another different approach is the
selection of the training set from a random set of weights on the examples in the training set.
In 1997, Amit and Geman defined a number of geometric features and search in a random set
of these for the best split at each node [22]. In 1998, Ho described the random subspace method
that selects randomly a subset of features that is used for the growth of each tree. [23]
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2.3.1 JTAG Based Attacks
As already referred in this document, the JTAG is very useful in some environments, but in other
more hostile environments it can lead to undesirable forms of exposure.
It is possible for a system to have multiple potential attackers, but some of the attacker’s
capabilities might be blocked by defenses.
Kurt Rosenfeld and Ramesh Karri from the Polytechnic Institute of New York University
described briefly five JTAG-based attacks [24] such as sniff secret data, read-out secret, obtain
test vectors and responses, modify state of authentic part or even to return false responses to
test. In these different attacks, the attacker possesses a limited set of capabilities, for example the
capability of modify the TDI/TDO signals, or control the TMS and TCK signals or even access
the keys used by the testers.
The sniffing attack has the goal of learning a secret message that is being sent to a specific chip
via JTAG. This attack consists in a false bypass done by the attacker, to let the message reach the
pre-determined chip without any modification. The key point to perform this attack is to capture a
copy of the message while it is being sent to the chip.
The read-out secret attack has the goal of learning a secret message from a device that already
has it. In this attack, two attackers’ chips are necessary, both in the same JTAG chain of the
chip under attack: one placed "before" the victim (attacker A) and the other one placed "after" it
(attacker B). To perform this attack correctly, the attacker A needs to control the TMS and TCK
lines, in order to act as the JTAG bus master and to try to do a scan operation to access the secrets
of the chip that is being attacked. Then, the attacker B will acquire the information as it is expelled
from the TDO of the chip.
The attack to obtain test vectors and responses, as the name indicates, is for the attacker to
obtain a copy of the test vectors and normal responses of a chip. In order to do this properly, the
tester sends test vectors to the device, which responds normally to these test vectors. The attacker,
placed after the victim, acquires the responses as they propagate from the device under test back
to the tester, which receives unmodified test responses.
The modify state of authentic part attack is used to modify the state of the chip that is being
attacked. The attacker chip is placed before the device under test/attack and it puts the JTAG TAP
of the chip into a state where it is able to transfer data into the chip. Hence, it is possible for the
attacker to set the state of the registers of the victim’s chip and affect the normal operation of the
device.
Finally, the return false responses to test attack has the goal of misleading the tester about the
real state of the chip being attacked. In order to test the state of a specific chip, the tester tries to
put all the others into BYPASS mode, but the attacker ignores this request and it introduces fake
responses that are transmitted back to the tester, putting all the other chips into BYPASS mode.
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2.3.2 Scan-based side-channel attacks
The scan chains are connected to an external JTAG interface and scan-based attacks can be used
as a side channel to retrieve secret keys by analyzing the scan data obtained from the scan chains.
2.3.2.1 Scan-based attacks against DES
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is one of the common-key-encryption methods, developed
by IBM. It is a symmetric algorithm which encrypts 64-bit data controlled by a 56-bit secret
key. Eight bits are only used for parity check [25]. There are 16 stages of processing, all of
them identical, and also an initial and final permutation, where each one undoes the action of the
other one, and none of them has any cryptographic meaning. A scan-based attack against Data
Encryption Standard has two major problems: the encryption timing, because attackers do not
know when the encryption is done, and the register connection order since they do not know the
correspondence between scan data and registers inside the scan chain.
In 2004, Yang, Wu and Karri proposed a mechanism to recover secret keys from a hardware
implementation of the Data Encryption Standard [26]. This method assumes the attackers knows
the DES algorithm and also can input any plaintexts into the target DES cryptosystem. Besides
this, it does not include registers capable of storing the secret and round keys. To solve the problem
of the encryption timing, Yang, Wu and Karri assumed that the attackers can obtain scan data at
any timing and to solve the register connection order problem. They also assumed that the content
of the plaintexts introduced into the cryptosystem differ one bit between each other and the scan
chain is composed only by the Round Register, Input Register and Output Register, with no other
registers included in the chain.
Later, Kodera, Yanagisawa and Togawa improved the mechanism proposed by Yang et al.,
using scan signatures [27]. They claim that the assumptions made to solve the problems of the
encryption timing and the register connection order are impossible to be applied to real and prac-
tical cases. Hence, they improved the mechanism by assuming that the scan chain includes at
least a 32-bit Round Register and also that the attackers may obtain scan data over several cycles.
Furthermore, they were interested in ensure that a scan signature was generated, focusing only on
a particular 1-bit column of comparison data. This means that the attacker does not need to know
the correspondence between scan data and registers of the chain. This scan signature indicates a
particular 1-bit register change when the plaintexts are inputted into the DES cryptosystem. Thus,
one of the most important features of this method is the number of plaintexts required to retrieve
secret keys correctly.
2.3.2.2 Scan-based attacks against AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a 128-bit symmetric key block cipher that can have three
different lengths for its key: 128, 192 or 256 bits. A major difference comparing with its prede-
cessor DES, is that AES does not use a Feistel Network, which is a symmetric structure used in
the construction of the block ciphers that allows the operations of encryption and decryption to
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be very similar, reversing the key schedule [28]. AES is divided into several identical cycles that
convert the input (plaintext) into the final output (ciphertext). The number of cycles varies with
the length of the key: for 128-bit keys the algorithm has 10 rounds, 12 rounds for 192-bit keys and
finally, 14 cycles for 256-bit keys [29].
There are several proposed attacks against AES and all of them operate in two steps: First, the
chip is in normal mode with its input plaintext applied to the primary outputs for only one cycle
of AES; then, the response of the round operation that is being stored in the scan chains is shifted
out. The attack is done using one of the differential properties of the round operation of the AES,
which tells that if one-bit difference is given in the least significant bit (LSB) of the 16 bytes, the
output difference can have 18 possible hamming distances. From these hamming distances, four
can be generated by a unique pair of S-box inputs. Thus, the attacker should follow these two
steps for all possible pairs of plaintexts and tries to get any one such hamming distances [30].
One of the existing attacks is the architecture proposed by Yang, Wu and Karri that maintains
the high test quality of the traditional scan DFT without compromising the security [31]. To show
that it is possible to compromise the secret key with the traditional DFT scheme, the authors used
an hardware implementation of the advanced encryption standard. All of the attacks can even
work in the presence of DFT structures such as partial scan [32], X-masking [33] and X-tolerant
architectures [34, 35].
Ali, Sinanoglu, Saeed and Karri found that all of the attacks described above have one common
disadvantage: their incapability of switching the device between the normal and the test mode,
preserving the data in the scan cells. This happens because all these attacks assume a perfect
access to functional inputs. Hence, they proposed a scan-based attack that only uses the test mode
[30]. Thus, the proposed method only requires applying the plaintext from the scan-in pins rather
than the functional inputs, which makes the attack more complex because the attacker is blinded
from the input side and from the output side. The challenging part is then the identification of the
scan cell that corresponds to the desired input bit. To do this, the attack is split in four different
steps: the first one is to determine the scan cells that correspond to the words; the second is to
determine the scan cells that correspond to the bytes; the third one determines the order of the
bytes in a word and, finally, the fourth step determines the order of the scan cells in a byte and thus
the corresponding key.
2.3.3 Reverse Engineering Techniques
Reverse engineering consists in extracting knowledge from anything man-made. It is normally
used to obtain missing knowledge or ideas when the information is not available or belongs to
someone that does not want to share. Usually the idea is to discover some secrets about a design,
in order to do a better one [36].
Domke published in 2009 a paper showing that the test modes of the JTAG can be reverse-
engineered by looking at the JTAG inputs and outputs [37]. To do this it is necessary to find the
JTAG pins. If no documentation is available for that specific IC, there are some tools that can be
used for this part. After finding the pins, it is necessary to determine the length of the instruction
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register, which means determining the number of accessible registers. Finding the length of the IR
is quite simple, after scan in several ones in order to fill the whole register, a single zero is scanned
in. Therefore, the number of clock cycles that is necessary to wait until the zero reaches the TDO,
is the length of the register.
It is important to be aware of some implementation specific behaviors that need to be deter-
mined, for example the possibility of having a scratch register that is transferred into the final
register when a certain control bit is toggled, or for example the possibility of having an additional
bit in the DR, to determine if the register is going to be updated or not.
2.3.4 Defense Mechanisms
2.3.4.1 Basic protocols
The simplest way to block malicious use of JTAG port is to restrict its functionality. This approach
is limited to certain situations where JTAG becomes unnecessary after initial testing. With this
approach a portion of the functionalities can be denied by modifying the JTAG port or by removing
part of the input/output using fuses [38].
2.3.4.2 Two-entity security protocol
Other defense methods for integrated circuits and JTAG, are based on user authentication or test
data encryption.
Novak and Biasizzo proposed a security extension for IEEE Std. 1149.1 [39] which provides
a locking mechanism that prevents unauthorized users from interfering, via test bus, with the
normal operation of the system. It is basically an access control solution in which a key must be
presented to the chip before the chip’s JTAG test access port can be controlled. The instruction set
of the TAP includes two additional instructions: lock and unlock. In the lock instruction, the TAP
control logic maps all the instructions, except the unlock, to a bypass instruction until the unlock
instruction with valid key code is applied, which secures the device operation. The structure of the
locking mechanism is presented in Figure 2.8.
As one can see in Figure 2.8, the comparator block compares the contents of the Lock Register
and the Key Register. If the contents are different, the locked signal fed to the Instruction Decoder
is activated, effectively locking the access to the system. To unlock, it compares the contents
again, and if they are equal, it deactivates the locked signal and the next instruction entered via
TDI can be executed [39]. This security mechanism proposed by Novak and Biasizzo requires a
small hardware overhead but it does not slow down the conventional boundary-scan tests.
Another method is to permit the use of JTAG port to all users, but encrypting or encoding the
input/output data using a secret key as described by Rosenfeld and Karri [24]. They employed
three standard security primitives in their scheme: a hash function, a stream cipher and a message
authentication code. Instead of using a PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) as Suh and Devadas
used [40], they used fuses and a hash, but the idea is similar. In Rosenfeld and Karri’s work, the
uniqueness comes from fuse bits that are programmed at the factory while in the work proposed by
2.3 Attacks and Defense Mechanisms - The current State of the Art 19
Figure 2.8: Structure of the locking mechanism proposed in [39]
Suh and Devadas, the uniqueness comes from subtle physical differences between chips. Both of
these works were extremely useful in what concerns JTAG defenses: on one hand, PUFs have the
advantage of being intrinsically unique which means that they do not need to be programmed with
the desired uniqueness; on the other hand, fuses have the advantages of using less area and also
being a reliable technology against temperature, aging and power variations. As already said, they
also used a stream cipher for encrypting JTAG communication and a message authentication code
scheme to protect against unauthentic JTAG messages, which in other words means the verification
that the message was sent by the authentic sender without being modified. The security scheme
proposed by Rosenfeld and Karri has four levels of protection that are going to be described with
detail:
• Level 0: it does not assure anything. The communication is exactly the same as what is
defined in IEEE 1149.1;
• Level 1: it is assured authenticity, in which the JTAG operations start after the tester extracts
from storage a code read protection (CRP) randomly, then send a challenge to the chip and
finally compare the chip’s response with the CRP;
• Level 2: besides the authenticity provided by the level 1, this level also provides secrecy of
the JTAG signals, which involves sending and receiving encrypted data to and from the data
register. It has two steps: setup and communication. In the first one, the goal is to establish
a shared secret between the tester and the chip;
• Level 3: this level is the last one in this security scheme and completes level 1 and 2 by
adding integrity, protecting the JTAG link against active attacks that attempt to insert or
modify messages.
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The disadvantage of this approach is the delay introduced by encryption or encoding pro-
cesses. These key-based security methods are truly dependent on the key management, because
all security features do not work if the key is disclosed. There could be several issues regarding
this key management and distribution mechanisms. For instance, delegating this management to
human causes insecurity; on other hand, if all devices shared the same key, the risk is even bigger;
the opposite, which would be assigning a unique key for each device leads to a cost problem.
2.3.4.3 Three-entity security protocol
In order to avoid the problems of distribution described in the two-entity security protocols, and
also ensure more security and efficiency, the scan-chains or the keys used for authentication must
be managed by a trusted and independent identity.
Pierce and Tragoudas presented the first detailed hardware implementation of a flexible mul-
tilevel security access system [41, 42]. In this mechanism, each scan chain is monitored by an
independent and separate security mechanism, which can restrict the types of data that can be
loaded into each scan chain and thus, it is possible to have different access levels per scan chain.
The architecture uses a hierarchical multi-level permission structure, where a user has an as-
sociated privilege level Pi and groups of instructions have an access level Ai. Only a user with a
privilege level Pi > Ai, can execute those instructions. Since this is a flexible system, the number
of permission levels is set by the designer of the IC.
As can be seen in the Figure 2.9, the proposed hardware consists in two components: the
Security Authentication Module (SAM) and the Access Monitor (AM). The SAM provides an
unlocking communication protocol, sets the user level and passes the privilege level to the Access
Monitor, which changes the accessible features of each scan chain and thus prevents harmful data
from being load into them.
This mechanism, besides the unlocking protocol at the beginning of a JTAG session, does not
introduce any additional timing overhead and its security strength is only dependent on the initial
authentication protocol, because the only component that can modify the memory in the Access
Monitor is the Security Authentication Module.
Buskey and Frosik proposed a solution that introduces different levels of access, based on
user’s permissions [43]. This mechanism controls the protection level of the device limiting the
interaction through the JTAG port. They implemented three protection levels, PL0, PL1 and PL2
and four access modes: AM0, AM1, AM2 and AM3.
Hence, the most secure protection level, PL0, limits user access through the JTAG port to ex-
ternal functions; the following level, PL1, besides allowing the same functionalities of the previous
one, also allows the programming of the flash memory and the writing and reading to registers.
This protection level is similar to the one provided by the standard JTAG; the last protection level,
PL2, allows full access to the device, including the secure registers or secure sections of memory.
The four access modes were created according to the normal life cycle of the products, that
require different access levels. This way, there is a non protected access mode (AM3), needed for
example during the product’s development phase, in which the access to the device through JTAG
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Figure 2.9: JTAG Block Diagram of the hardware proposed in [41] and [42]
port is unrestricted. For this access level, the device should be configured with the protection level
PL2 described previously. The next level, in which the protection mode should be set to PL1, or
sometimes to PL2 (only available to authorized users), is the low protection access mode (AM2).
A device configured with this low protection access mode allows standard debugging functions,
writing to flash memory, and viewing or modifying the processor’s registers and ROM. Increasing
the security, the high protection access mode (AM1) provides only the circuitry debugging func-
tions and the protection level should be set to PL0, but it can be temporarily reduced to PL1 or PL2
by an authenticated user. Finally, the last access mode is the maximum protection access mode
(AM0) and is intended for the products that contain very sensitive information. The protection
level is, therefore, set to PL0 and downgrading is not supported.
Regarding the user authorization, this solution requires a secure database containing the cre-
dentials. This database is checked during an authorization process, and its functions are delegated
to another trusted identity, a secure server. The authorization process is based on asymmetric
cryptography, in which the device owns a public key and the secure server holds the private key.
A mechanism which complements some of the weaknesses found in the two-entity protocols
and in this previous three-entity protocol from Frosik and Buskey and also enhances its strengths,
is a JTAG security mechanism proposed by Park, Yoo, Kim and Kim which consists in a system
based on credentials [7].
Their approach has a lower implementation cost than encryption/decryption-based solutions
because its authentication protocol only uses hash and XOR calculations, instead of complex
asymmetric cryptography like the one presented before. Also, it eliminates the possibility of
key leaks because, instead of secret keys, their method authenticates and allows access to users
using credentials and passwords issued by a remote server. Another improvement of this mecha-
nism compared with the Frosik and Buskey’s method, is the availability. Once the credentials are
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issued, the host does not need further communications with the authentication servers.
The authentication scheme proposed by Park et al. grants also different access levels to users,
based on the permission of the credential. This scheme consists in two phases: the credential
issue phase and the user authentication phase. The first one is the stage when the user receives the
credential from the server. The server verifies the identity and the correspondent access level and,
if the user is authenticated, it provides the credential. The second phase is for the authentication of
a user that already has a valid credential for the Secure JTAG, as the authors called it. In this phase,
the JTAG allows access to all features defined in the credential and authenticates the user based
on the submitted credential and password. The main advantages provided by this mechanism are
the impossibility to use a valid credential without its password and, even having knowledge of the
password, the user cannot request other access levels.
Besides the normal control logic present in all JTAG devices, this Secure JTAG has also an
authentication logic, controlled by the TAP controller and the instruction decoder of the control
logic. This authentication logic consists in a random number generator, a hash engine and a non-
volatile memory, and is responsible for the execution of all authentication steps.
Finally, in this credential-based mechanism, is also possible to assign a limit to the number of
times a credential can be used and also share a group credential, instead of assigning one credential
for each developer, with the appropriate configuration, when several developers are testing a single
device.
In summary, some of the security mechanisms proposed in this chapter are extremely safe and
accurate. However, as previously introduced, it is possible to learn the patterns that correspond
to illegitimate actions and therefore define a system based on machine learning. This learning
approach consists of the main difference of the proposed system when compared with others in
the literature. Furthermore, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first security system
to use this kind of approach. Combining this system with some other mechanism can result in an
extremely high security level, as it will be shown in section 3.3, where a comparison between the
different methods is done.
Chapter 3
Description of the System and Training
of the Trees
This chapter is divided into two important parts. Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 consist in a detailed
description of the system, its architecture, its main features and all the modules it has. Section 3.4
presents some important aspects related to the random forest, such as the training and searching
for the optimal number of trees.
3.1 System Overview
As already mentioned, this work is based on the security scheme proposed in [2], which monitors
in real time the behavior of JTAG using an on-chip machine learning approach, while protecting
backdoors from misusing and consequently detecting illegal accesses to the chip.
In order to be able to perform attacks, the attackers need to behave differently than the normal
users, because they need to discover and characterize the undocumented functions without being
aware of the implemented functions and how they work. Thereby, it is possible to have an on-chip
classifier that decides the legitimacy of the access.
The authors propose an on-chip classifier based on a single decision tree; instead, in this work
the on-chip classifier is implemented with a random forest, an ensemble of decision trees.
To detect the attacks, the method uses a scheme containing two steps: offline learning and
online prediction. In the first step, it is necessary to train the decision trees of the forest by
extracting features from JTAG programs and to store them in a memory. The extraction of the
features is assisted with a look-up table (LUT) that contains information related to the transitions
between instructions. Then, the second step, the online prediction stage, consists in supplying the
forest with the same set of extracted features. This allows for the possibility of making predictions
about whether an instruction is normal or suspicious. In order to improve the accuracy of the next
predictions, the LUT containing the transitions between instructions is modified at the end of this
process.
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Figure 3.1: Two phases of the mechanism proposed in [2]
To illustrate the detection method, figure 3.1 shows, in detail, both of these two steps: offline
learning and online prediction.
To characterize the difference of behavior between normal use and illegitimate use, the authors
propose to use eight features, seven of them related to intra-instruction statistics and the last one
to the inter-instruction transition:
1. Four most significant bits (MSB) of the instruction
2. Four least significant bits (LSB) of the instruction
3. Number of shift Data Register cycles
4. Number of cycles in Run-Test/Idle (RTI) state
5. Number of cycles in Test-Logic-Reset (TLR) state
6. Number of test-mode select (TMS) transitions
7. Instruction defined
8. Transition miss
The first and second features represent jointly the 8-bit opcode of the instruction. The third one
is related to the number of the Data Register (DR) shift cycles, because without prior knowledge
of the length of the DR, it may be hard to be able to shift the register the number of desired cycles.
The fourth feature defines the number of cycles in Run-Test/Idle (RTI) state and the fifth feature
defines the number of cycles in the Test-Logic-Reset (TLR) state. Feature number six consists in
the number of transitions of the TMS, and feature seven checks whether the opcode loaded into
the instruction register is valid or not. Finally, feature eight, checks the legitimacy of the transition
from one instruction to another, based on the information read from the LUT. All these features
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Figure 3.2: System Architecture
are captured when the Instruction Register (IR) is updated with a new opcode and are then fed into
the forest.
3.2 System Architecture
The architecture of the system is shown in Figure 3.2.
The detection system is composed by four main modules: an on-chip classifier, a look-up
table, a data collector and a feature adapt logic. The classifier is represented in blue since it is the
main focus of this work. The figure also shows the JTAG TAP Controller which will be integrated
and implemented in the FPGA together with the entire system.
3.2.1 On-chip Classifier
The on-chip classifier is based on a random forest, it includes the module of the decision trees,
a memory that stores the structure of all the trees and a control Finite State Machine (FSM) to
manage the predictions between the trees. The control FSM includes a Majority Vote Unit that
makes the final prediction based on the predictions of all trees. As stated before, the on-chip
classifier is capable of making predictions whether an instruction is legitimate or not. It receives
the eight features that represent the current instruction from the Data Collector and then it starts
evaluating them using the forest. In addition, the classifier also receives an Update Instruction
Register signal which is active when the JTAG TAP Controller is in the Update IR State and thus
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is responsible for the starting of the classifications. Its operation will be detailed in Chapter 4,
since it is implemented with two different approaches.
3.2.2 Data Collector
The Data Collector is responsible for the interaction with the JTAG, extracting the features. Al-
though it is not shown in the figure, it receives the JTAG input bits, TDI and TMS, the current
instruction, the next instruction, the TAP Controller state, the update Instruction Register signal,
and the Shift Data Register signal, which is active when the TAP Controller is in that same state.
These last five inputs are sent by the TAP Controller. The Data Collector transforms the input bits
and instructions into features that are then supplied to the on-chip classifier. These features are
updated when the update Instruction Register signal is triggered.
3.2.3 Look-up Table
The Look-up Table (LUT) stores information about the transitions between instructions. It inter-
acts with the data collector and with the feature adapt logic. Hence, it has a top module to control
this interaction with both modules, for instance, choosing the address and enabling the reading or
writing. More details and how the information is stored will be explained in Chapter 4.
3.2.4 Feature Adapt Logic
Finally, the proposed mechanism also has a feature adapt logic that modifies the LUT of the
transitions between instructions and sets the final outputs. It delays the labeling of the JTAG
operation until it gathers a significant evidence. Specifically, it waits for 4 consecutive predictions
before taking any action. It receives the current and next instructions from the data collector, the
final classification and a flag that indicates this classification is complete, from the classifier, and
the data read from the LUT. The output called Address Valid, is a 1-bit signal that helps the LUT
defining the address, as will be further explained.
3.2.5 JTAG TAP Controller
The JTAG TAP Controller represented in green in Figure 3.2 is a module of the OpenSPARC T2
Processor from Sun Microsystems [3], which is an open-source processor design and has been used
in many projects. It simulates the behavior of the normal TAP Controller from a JTAG device. The
JTAG TAP Controller is basically the 16-state FSM represented in Figure 2.2, and it converts the
JTAG input bits into instructions that are supplied to the data collector and to the feature adapt
logic. It also sends to the data collector the current state of the TAP Controller and two one-
bit signals (Update Instruction Register and Shift Data Register) that are set to 1 when the TAP
Controller is these respective states.
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Table 3.1, extracted from [2] compares some of the protection schemes with the proposed mecha-
nism. As shown in the table, the proposed mechanism only works for the undocumented backdoors
because the attacker can not be aware of the correct operations of the JTAG. Each scheme has its
own disadvantages and risks. For instance, in a password-based mechanism, if the password is
leaked, the security is immediately compromised. In a protocol-based method, the failure of the
network is undoubtedly a potential risk. Therefore, combining the proposed mechanism with one
of the already described, for instance, the password-based, can be an excellent option, because it
makes the attacks harder. In that case, it would be necessary to know how to operate the JTAG
correctly and also the password in order to perform an attack successfully.
It is important to note that the proposed algorithm has a higher security level, compared with
passwords protocols or on-chip compression or compaction.
Table 3.1: Comparison between protection schemes, from [2]
JTAG
Protection
Scheme
Protected
Target
Knowledge
of JTAG
Operation
Hardware
Overhead
Potential
Risks
Security
Level
Disable JTAG
All
functions
Maybe Small Invasive attack High
On-chip
compression/
comparison
Boundary Scan Maybe Medium
Differential
attack
Low
Password-based
authentication
All functions Maybe Medium
Password
leakage
Medium
Protocol-based
authentication
All functions Maybe Large
Eavesdropping,
Network fails
High
Proposed
Learning
System
Undocumented
backdoors
No Medium
Attacker with
previous
knowledge
High
3.4 Random Forest Training
As referred in Section 2.2.3, there are several algorithms to train the trees of a random forest.
In this work, bagging or bootstrap aggregation was used, and the training was performed using
MATLAB.
Bootstrap aggregation consists in generating independent training sets from the original set
and training each tree using different training sets. Hence, each tree of the forest grows on an in-
dependently replica of the original training data. Observations that are not included in the replica
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Figure 3.3: Example of a tree of the forest classifier
are called out-of-bag, and can be used to perform the out-of-bag error which evaluates the perfor-
mance of the random forest.
During the training phase, a training set was provided by the authors [2]. The data set has
14124 observations: 7674 for training and 6450 for testing.
The first step of the training is to define if the features are categorical or numerical. Categorical
features are discrete ones that can just take one specific value from a number of fixed values. On
contrary, numerical features are continuous and can take any value within an interval. Hence, the
split values in each node of the trees, to decide whether the evaluation should go left or right,
are different based on the features. For the categorical features, the node checks if the feature is
included in a set of values while for the numerical features the node has a threshold and it evaluates
if the value of the feature is above or below the threshold, further determining to split to right or
left, respectively.
Figure 3.3 shows an example of a tree trained by the data set provided. It is important to note
that the categorical features are the features number 1, 2, 7 and 8. As one can see, in this example
the first node evaluates the feature 8 that checks if the next instruction is defined in the LUT or
not. Other trees of the forest may start by evaluating other features, and not the feature number 8
as this one.
To train the trees, the class TreeBagger in MATLAB was used. It includes the constructor
function and several methods to add trees, estimate errors, margins, etc. The function creates an
ensemble of bagged decision trees after receiving the train data, the train label and the number
of the trees. Since the trees need to be stored on chip, the number of trees in a forest leads to
a trade-off with memory space. To solve this problem, different numbers, from 2 to 40, were
tried to search for the optimal number of trees. In order to be more accurate and precise, the
ensembles were generated 100 times, averaging the out-of-bag error and the classification margin
over these 100 executions. The out-of-bag error computes the misclassification probability for
out-of-bag observations in the training data. The classification margin is the difference between
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(a) Average Classification Margin (b) Out-of-bag Error
Figure 3.4: Training results averaged over 100 executions
the classification score for the true class and maximal classification score for the false classes. It
is an important metric of representation of the success of the training, illustrating the benefit of
adding more trees to the ensemble.
Figure 3.4 shows the results of the training of the trees. Figure 3.4a represents the classification
margin while figure 3.4b shows the out-of-bag error in terms of number of trees. The point marked
in the figure indicates the optimal number of trees chosen for the forest. As one can see, the forest
comprises 11 trees. This number gives a good classification margin and the error is also very
satisfactory. Indeed, with more trees, for instance 35 or 40, both perform slightly better, which
however requires much more memory on chip.
It is important to note that the out-of-bag error plot is consistent with the results obtained
by the authors. Their classifier was simulated with a single decision tree with an error of about
8.17 % which is very close to the result obtained in the second plot, with just one grown tree.
Thereby, with an 11-tree forest, the error is reduced from 8.17 % to approximately 6.70 %, which
consequently means an increase in the accuracy from 91.83 % to 93.30 % (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Comparison between a single decision tree and an 11-tree random forest
Implementation Error
Decision Tree 8.17 %
11-Tree Forest 6.70 %
Once the random forest is trained, the description of the trees in text format is generated in
MATLAB, and saved as .txt files. This file contains as many lines as nodes in each tree and each
line/node follows the syntax represented below, where x1 is the feature under evaluation:
if x1 in {0 1 2 6} then node 4 elseif x1 in {3 4 5 8} then node 5 else 0
These .txt files are then converted to .hex files, in order to be stored in memory. The structure
of these .hex files will be detailed in chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Hardware Implementation of the
Modules
This chapter is related with the hardware implementation of all the modules of the system. It
describes how they are designed, their operation and synthesis results, specially concerning area
and time. However, it starts with a brief presentation of the board that was used.
4.1 The Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
This section gives a brief introductory description of the FPGA used in this work, which is present
in the Zynq-7000 ZC706 Evaluation Kit, from Xilinx.
The board, shown in Figure 4.1 taken from the Xilinx website, is extremely powerful and
contains numerous tools and components, for instance a DDR3 component memory of 1 Giga-
byte and a DDR3 SODIMM memory of 1 Gigabyte as well. It also has several different ports,
connectors and controllers that allow different types of communication, such as USB, JTAG, Eth-
ernet, PCI Express, HDMI, SD Card, I2C, SPI and UART. The FPGA chip present on the board
is the Zynq-7000 All Programmable SoC Z-7045 which is composed by a Dual ARM Cortex-A9
core processor. Since the System-On-Chip (SoC) allows the creation and customization of co-
processors that interact with the ARM processor, this complete system will be implemented as a
co-processor.
There are two different ways of designing an implementation for the Zynq-7000 ZC706 board.
The first is using a bare-metal application which runs directly on the SoC. In this option, the
programmable logic is programmed via JTAG which requires the reset of the board and makes
harder the load of data into the system. The second is to install a Linux based operating system
(OS) in the SD Card, which can be done by loading the binaries of the kernel and the bootloader
that are provided by Xilinx. The board can be accessed via Ethernet using a secure shell (SSH)
connection and the bitstream generated on Vivado is loaded into the board. This option has the
advantage of allowing the configuration without the need of a reset, while the operating system is
running.
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Figure 4.1: Xilinx Zynq-7000 ZC706 Evaluation Kit
The number of configurable logic blocks (CLB) of the FPGA is impressive. It contains 437200
flip-flops (FF), 218600 look-up tables (LUT), 70400 Memory LUTs, 32 global buffers for clock
lines (BUFG), 8 Mixed-Mode Clock Managers (MMCM), between many others. BUFG are global
buffers that are most commonly used for clock nets to provide the least possible amount of skew
between registers that are physically located large distances apart.
Further details about the communication between the processing system and the system’s co-
processor will be given in Chapter 5. The next sections describe the implemented hardware, which
was simulated and synthesized using Vivado Design Suite, also from Xilinx.
4.2 The Classifier
The implementation of the classifier followed two different approaches: one sequential and one
parallel. Both of them were implemented in the FPGA and are described in this section along with
a comparison between the two.
4.2.1 Storage of Decision Trees Structure
As referred in section 3.4 the .txt files containing the trees are converted to .hex files through a C
program, that evaluates each line and each value of the text. These .hex files are then stored in
memories, where each tree occupies 512 positions of 40 bits. Categorical nodes are stored from
the position 256 to 511 while numerical nodes are in the positions 0 - 255. As also stated, the
categorical nodes need to compare a set of discrete values with the current value of the feature,
therefore each categorical node is represented by two lines of the .hex file. Hence, with the 512
positions, it is possible to store 384 nodes: 256 numerical nodes and 128 categorical nodes. The
structure of each position of the memory is represented in Figure 4.2.
As one can see, the first line is common to either categorical or numerical nodes. The bits 0
to 23 store the addresses of each one of the son nodes of the current node. Since the tree has 512
positions, only 9 bits are necessary to represent an address, therefore 3 bits in each address are not
being used. However, 12 bits are reserved for each address for two reasons: the first is because
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Figure 4.2: Structure of positions of memory
the C program that converts the trees from .txt to .hex writes in hexadecimal format and thus, it
might be only possible to write either 8 bits (which are not enough) or 12; the second reason is the
possibility of increasing the size of the trees, for example by training them with a different data set.
Then, it is necessary 8 bits to store the threshold value for the numerical nodes (bits 24 to 31) and
2 bits to store the labels, although 4 are defined. Label[0] (bit 32) represents the prediction, where
0 means normal action and 1 means illegitimate action, and label[1] (bit 33) represents whether
the current node is a leaf node or not. If it is a leaf node, this bit is 1 and the label[0] is valid. On
the other hand, if it is not a leaf node, the value of the label[0] is not valid, since only leaf nodes
have the final classifications. The last 4 bits are the index of the feature that is being evaluated in
that node.
The second line is only for the categorical nodes and it stores 8 discrete values to compare
with the current feature. If the value of the current feature is within those 8 values, the tree goes
to the left son; if it is not, it follows the son to the right. The discrete values are 4 bits each, since
the features number 1 and 2, that are categorical, have also 4 bits each. Features 7 and 8 are also
categorical, however they are composed by just 1 bit.
It is important to note that the threshold bits of the first line are also used in the categorical
nodes to define the discrete values of the second line that are valid. The value of the categorical
feature will only be compared with valid discrete values. For instance, if the threshold of a cate-
gorical node is 8’b00101100, only the discrete values number 2, 3 and 5 (positions where the bit
is 1) are valid and will be compared with the current feature.
The storage of the trees is slightly different in the two implementations of the classifier, that
will be described in this section. In the sequential implementation, the trees are stored all together,
in a memory of 5632 positions, which corresponds to 512 positions× 11 trees. On the other hand,
in the parallel implementation, the trees are stored in 11 separate memories, of 512 positions each.
Both of these memories are asynchronous, which means the clock is not necessary. The data from
the addressed location is available on the output bus after the access time. Hence, these memories
are created from LUT cells of the board and therefore they are called Distributed Memories, which
as the term indicates, are memories distributed throughout the chip inside the logic blocks.
The resources used by these two memories are shown in the table 4.1, however it is important
to note that the smaller memories are replicated 11 times in the design. A better comparison
between the two implementations will be given in section 4.2.5.
The number of Memory LUT used is exactly the same, since 320 × 11 = 3 520, however the
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Table 4.1: Trees’ Memory Resources Usage
Resource Utilization Available Utilization (%)
All-trees 1-Tree All-trees 1-Tree
LUT 3 822 362 218 600 1.75 0.17
Memory LUT 3 520 320 70 400 5.00 0.45
BUFG 1 1 32 3.12 3.12
number of LUTs is slightly different. Multiplying the number of LUTs of the smaller memory by
the 11 memories, 362 × 11 = 3982, it is possible to see an increase of 160 LUT compared with
the memory that has all the trees together.
4.2.2 The Decision Tree
The decision tree module is almost the same in both implementations of the classifier, either se-
quential or parallel. It is implemented using the universal node proposed in [19] where the nodes
in the current path are evaluated sequentially, from the root node to the leaf node of the decision
tree.
The inputs of the module are the 8 input features described in section 3.1 as well as the clock,
reset and prediction start. The prediction start is the update instruction register signal that comes
from the JTAG and passes through the Data Collector, which means the JTAG TAP Controller is
in the Update IR state and a new classification should be started. The outputs are just two bits, one
to flag when the final classification is complete, and the other with the classification itself, where
0 represents a normal action and 1 represents an illegal action. In the sequential implementation,
this module has one extra input that represents the number of the current tree to evaluate.
The decision tree module has two simple finite state machines (FSM) of only two states each.
The first one controls when the module is active or idle. When the update instruction register
signal is active, meaning that the module should start a new classification, the machine passes
from the state idle to the state active, starting the prediction. When the prediction is complete, the
tree goes back to the idle state, to wait for the next update instruction register signal.
The second FSM controls the reading from the memory that stores the tree, which is only
done in the active state of the FSM described in the last paragraph. As mentioned, the cate-
gorical nodes occupy two lines of 40 bits each. Therefore, two lines are always read and this
FSM controls the reading of these lines, ensuring that the first line is read before moving the ad-
dress to the second line. These two lines are assigned to three temporary 40-bit variables, called
current_categorical_data, current_numerical_data and current_categorical_candidates. The first
line that was read is assigned to the first two variables, while the second line is assigned to the cur-
rent_categorical_candidates, since it represents the discrete values to compare with the current
value, when the node is categorical. Then, the division of the bits to different variables is done in
the current_categorical_data and current_numerical_data, as shown in Figure 4.2.
4.2 The Classifier 35
Figure 4.3: Operation of the Sequential Classifier
The last step is just the decision of going left or right in the tree. First, the current feature needs
to be defined by analyzing bits 36-39 that represent the Feature Index. According to the index, the
value of one of the eight features is assigned to a variable called current_node_feature. Then, if
the node is numerical, it is only necessary to do a comparison between that current_node_feature
and the current threshold. If the current feature is smaller than the threshold, then the next node
should be the left son. Otherwise, the next node is on the right path. In contrast, if the node is
categorical, the four LSB of the current feature (since the categorical features do not have more
than 4 bits) are compared with the discrete values of the second line, that are present in the variable
current_categorical_candidates. As mentioned in the previous section, the threshold bits of the
first line are also used in this part, to define the discrete values that are valid. Only the valid values
are compared with the 4-LSB of the current_node_feature. If the current feature is equal to one of
the valid discrete values, the following node is the left son. On the contrary, if it is not within the
values, the tree should take the right path.
Finally, the bit 33 (Label[1]) is analyzed. If it is one, it means a leaf node was reached and
the final classification is defined, along with the flag indicating it is complete. If it is not one, the
address is updated with the correct son node address, and the evaluation of the nodes continues.
4.2.3 The Sequential Classifier
The sequential classifier does the predictions one at each time, from the tree number 0 to the tree
number 10. As previously mentioned, in this implementation, all the trees are stored together.
Hence, an extra variable is used, representing the number of the tree (Tree_ID) that is being eval-
uated, in order to load the right node from the memory. This variable will be used as input for the
decision tree module, as described in the previous section. The inputs of the sequential classifier
module are exactly the same as the decision tree module, while the outputs represent the final clas-
sification instead of the classification of just one tree. The predictions of the 11 trees are controlled
by an FSM, illustrated in figure 4.3, with 3 states: initial, predict and final.
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The initial state waits until a new update instruction register signal is active. When this signal
is triggered, the classifier goes to the state predict where it starts the prediction of the tree number
0. When the system detects the rising edge of the flag that indicates the prediction of the tree
is complete, the number of the tree is incremented and its prediction (0 or 1) is accumulated in
a variable sum. The prediction start signal of the decision tree module is set to 1 again, and the
next tree starts predicting. When the number of trees reaches the last tree, the FSM goes to the
final state that represents the majority vote unit, where the value of the variable sum is compared
with the number of trees over 2. If it is bigger, then it means that the majority of the predictions
were 1 and the final classification output is set to 1. In contrast, if it is smaller, it means a normal
action and the final classification is 0. Also, this state sets to 1 the flag that indicates the final
classification is complete.
4.2.4 The Parallel Classifier
On the opposite, in the parallel version, the universal tree node is replicated 11 times, each one
with its own memory of 512 positions, in order to allow 11 accesses at the same time. There is
no need to use a variable that represents the number of the current tree. However, two vectors
are created, with 11 positions each: one to store the predictions of all the trees (named class) and
the other to store the flags of prediction complete (named done). The operation of the parallel
classifier is similar to the sequential version, since it is also controlled by an FSM with 3 states:
initial, trees and final.
Likewise the sequential, the initial state waits until a new update instruction register signal is
active. Once it is active, the FSM goes to the state trees, where all the 11 decision trees start their
classifications at the same time. Hence, when a tree has its prediction complete, it stores it in the
corresponding position of the vector class setting also the flag that indicates it is complete, in the
vector done. While in this state, the variable sum is constantly being updated with the sum of the
11 positions of the vector class. Once the vector done is totally full with ones, meaning that all the
trees completed their prediction, the system moves to the final state. This state defines the final
classification and the global flag exactly in the same way as in the sequential implementation.
The operation of the parallel classifier can be better visualized in the figure 4.4.
4.2.5 Comparison of both Sequential and Parallel
Before the integration with the other modules of the system and with the JTAG, that will be de-
scribed in Chapter 5, the two versions of the classifier were implemented in the FPGA. To test
the classifiers, several sets of eight input features were applied, representing both normal and il-
legitimate actions. The way how the inputs are applied and how the output results are shown in
the terminal of the computer will be explained later, with the complete implementation, since the
principle is the same.
The results of these implementations concerning area and time are presented in this section.
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Figure 4.4: Operation of the Paralell Classifier
4.2.5.1 Resources Usage
The resources usage of both implementations is shown in Table 4.2. These results include the en-
tire interface to communicate between the processing system of the FPGA and the programmable
logic, that will be explained later as referred.
Table 4.2: Sequential and Parallel Classifiers Resources Usage
Resource Utilization Available Utilization (%)
Sequential Parallel Sequential Parallel
Flip-Flops 840 1 292 437 200 0.19 0.30
LUT 4 243 4 945 218 600 1.94 2.26
Memory LUT 3 408 3 144 70 400 4.84 4.47
BUFG 1 1 32 3.12 3.12
As one can see, the parallel implementation is slightly bigger than the sequential one, which
was expected since the parallel implementation contains 11 universal nodes instead of just one.
The difference in the number of Memory LUTs might be less expected than the other resources,
since the stored data (the structure of the trees) is the same in both implementations. As it is
possible to see in the resources usage of the trees memory in Table 4.1, the number of memory
LUTs were the same when the memory blocks were synthesized individually, without any system
or module integrated. However, the memory LUTs consist of blocks of a variable number of bits
with a specific width and depth. The way how the memories are instantiated in the top modules
and in the system determines the optimizations that the software does to synthesize them. The
memory LUT blocks are generally instantiated with depths on the order of a power of two since
the synthesizer allocates these memories to the blocks of physical memories that exist in the board.
Since the parallel implementation uses 11 memories of 512 positions, which is a power of two, it
is easier to allocate them. Finally, it is possible to conclude that both of the implementations are
extremely small compared with the entire board.
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4.2.5.2 Timing Performance
The major difference between the implementations is the timing performance, as would be ex-
pected. To compare both, as mentioned, several sets of input features were applied to the classi-
fiers and the number of clock cycles needed to compute the final classification was determined.
Table 4.3 shows the number of clock cycles with two specific sets of features, set 0 and set 1. Set
0 represents an illegitimate action while set 1 consists in a normal action.
Table 4.3: Number of clock cycles to classify two specific sets of input features
Implementation Set 0 Set 1
Sequential 187 cycles 215 cycles
Parallel 22 cycles 28 cycles
Table 4.4 shows the time needed to classify the same two sets of Table 4.3. This time is
calculated with a clock frequency of 50 MHz (period of 20 ns), which is the value that was used
since it is the frequency of the interface between the processing system and the coprocessors of
the FPGA, that will be further explained.
Table 4.4: Time spent to classify two specific sets of input features
Implementation Set 0 Set 1
Sequential 3 740 ns 4 300 ns
Parallel 440 ns 560 ns
As it is easily seen, the parallel implementation performs much faster than the sequential
version. The increase may vary between 7 and 11 times, which would happen if all the trees took
the same time for the classification. But since the trees are independently trained and different in
number of nodes and depth (number of levels), it would not be correct to affirm that the time is
always reduced 11 times.
4.3 The Look-up Table (LUT)
The Look-up Table is a memory with 256 positions of 32 bits each. Each position is accessed
through an 8-bit address that consists in the opcode of a JTAG instruction, public or private, de-
fined in the OpenSPARC T2 and it contains 4 opcodes of 8 bits each, which represent 4 possible
instructions that may be executed after the current instruction. This module is used by the Data
Collector to assist in the extraction of features, as will be detailed in the next section.
If all the 4 opcodes are 8’b11111111 it means that the instruction is undefined, which is also
extremely important for the extraction of the features.
Besides the Data Collector, the LUT can also be accessed by the Feature Adapt Logic. The
Data Collector can only read from the LUT, to help in the extraction of features as mentioned,
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Figure 4.5: RTL Schematic of the LUT
while the Feature Adapt Logic can read or write, since it can modify the LUT based on the pre-
dictions of the classifier. This will be further detailed in the section 4.5. Both the reading and the
writing mechanisms are controlled by their correspondent enable.
The memory of 256x32 is placed inside a top module that interacts with the other modules, in
order to define the address to read or write to/from the LUT, since the address can be defined in the
data collector or in the feature adapt logic. To decide which one should be used, the top module of
the LUT also has an extra input bit, called address_valid that comes from the feature adapt logic.
This bit controls a multiplexer that decides the address. If this bit is 1, then the address should
be defined as the address sent by the feature adapt logic. If it is 0, then the address used should
be the one from the data collector. Also, the LUT top module decides when the read enable is
active, based on the read enables from the data collector and from the feature adapt logic. The
RTL Schematic of the LUT is shown in Figure 4.5. The memory itself is within the block called
LUTMEM while the other two multiplexers and the OR gate are in the top module, to define the
address, enables and data to write, as described.
The Look-up Table was synthesized individually and the resources usage is shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Look-up Table Resources Usage
Resource Utilization Available Utilization (%)
LUT 175 218 600 0.08
Memory LUT 128 70 400 0.18
BUFG 1 32 3.12
4.4 The Data Collector
The Data Collector converts the current instruction into features which are then supplied to the
on-chip classifier.
Features 1 and 2 consists in reporting the instruction itself, that it receives from the TAP
controller dividing it into 4 most significant bits and least significant bits, respectively.
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Feature 3 counts the number of shift cycles of the data register. The data collector module has
1-bit input that indicates when the TAP Controller is in the shift data register state. Every time the
value of this bit is 1, the data collector will add 1 to the counter. This counting is done between
two consecutive update instruction register signals. If a new one comes, the counter goes back to
zero and starts again.
To define the feature 4, the data collector also analyzes the current state of the TAP controller
with the TAP controller state input, referred in section 3.2.2. Every time the TAP Controller is in
the Run-Test/Idle (RTI) state, a counter is incremented until a new update IR signal arrives.
Feature 5 is also very similar to features 3 and 4 since it consists in counting the number of
cycles in the Test-Logic-Reset state, using the same input as feature 4, which represents the current
state of the TAP controller.
Feature 6 counts the number of transitions of the test-mode select (TMS). As mentioned, the
data collector module receives the TDI and TMS. The previous and the current TMS are stored
and compared. When the current is different than the previous, then it means a flip occurred, and
the value of the feature 6 is incremented.
Finally, features 7 and 8 are slightly different as they require an interaction with the LUT.
Feature 7 consists in evaluating if the current instruction is defined. To read from the LUT, the
address, which is 8-bit long, is defined as the current instruction and the read enable is assigned
every time the update IR signal is 1. As referred in section 4.3, each position of the LUT has 32
bits, which represent four instructions of 8 bits each. If in the position of the current instruction
the next four possible instructions are all 8’hFF, then it means the current instruction is undefined
and feature 7 is set to 1. Feature 8 is quite similar in the sense it also evaluates the content of the
LUT in the position of the current instruction. However, the data collector module also receives
the 8 bits of the next instruction. A transition miss is reported, and consequently feature 8 is 1,
when the next instruction is different from all the four instructions defined in the LUT.
The data collector was synthesized individually and the results are shown in the Table 4.6. One
can see that the module is extremely small. In fact, the RTL Schematic is shown in Figure 4.6. It
is not possible to see all the components in detail, but it is sufficient to show that this module is
composed mainly by comparators, AND gates and multiplexers. The registers on the right store
the eight features that are then forward to the classifier.
Table 4.6: Data Collector Resources Usage
Resource Utilization Available Utilization (%)
Flip-Flops 85 437 200 0.02
LUT 58 218 600 0.03
BUFG 1 32 3.12
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Figure 4.6: RTL Schematic of the Data Collector
4.5 The Feature Adapt Logic
The Feature Adapt Logic or feature revision mechanism was proposed in the initial paper due to
the variance that naturally occurs within both legitimate and illegitimate uses of the JTAG. Thus,
this module delays the labeling of the JTAG operations until it gathers ample information, as will
be described.
The inputs of the feature adapt module, besides the clock and reset, are the current instruction
and the next instruction, that come from the data collector, the classification and the flag that
indicates the classification is complete from the random forest classifier and the data that is read
from the LUT. The outputs are the address, read and write enables, data to write and the extra bit
referred in the section 4.3 that makes the address valid. All of these are for the interaction with
the LUT, since this module can modify the LUT based on the predictions. However, the most
important outputs are an alert flag and a counter that determines the number of alerts a specific
set of instructions had. These will be also outputs of the complete system, as will be described in
Chapter 5.
The feature adapt module is responsible for two main actions: trigger the security alert and
adapt the LUT. Since the alert is triggered every 4 instructions, the design has a period counter and
a flag that is assigned to 1 from 4 to 4 instructions. It is also necessary a counter for the number
of illegitimate predictions that are accumulated in that period of 4 instructions. There are also two
important variables that must be explained, called remove request and insert request. The remove
request is one if the number of illegitimate predictions is equal or bigger than a high threshold
that is defined, while the insert request is one if there are less or equal illegitimate predictions
than a low threshold. These threshold were defined as 3 and 1, respectively for the high and
low. This means that if the classifier sent 3 or 4 illegitimate predictions in the same period of 4
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Figure 4.7: Control FSM of the Feature Adapt Logic module
instructions, the remove request is set to one. Following the same thought, if the predictions sent
by the classifier are all legal or just one illegitimate, the insert request is set to one.
Hence, the security alert is defined based on the value of these two variables of removing and
inserting requests. If the remove request is one, then the alert is set to 1 as well and if the insert
request is one, the alert is 0, since no illegal actions are taking place. It is important to reinforce
the idea that this alert signal is updated every four instructions, so during the first 3 following
instructions, it keeps the value that resulted from the previous 4 instructions.
The second feature of this module is to adapt the LUT as referred. This is controlled by a finite
state machine (FSM) with 4 states, represented in the Figure 4.7. The states are controlled only by
the variables insert and remove request.
As it is possible to see in the figure, the system is always in the idle state, until either the remove
request or the insert request is active. When one of them is active, the system goes through all the
other 3 states (read, adapt and write with this order), and stays for just one clock cycle in each one.
In order to work properly, the insert and remove requests need to last for a long period, but since
they are only updated from 4 to 4 instructions, this situation is perfectly controlled. In the read
state, as the name indicates, the feature adapt module just reads the content (32 bits) from the LUT,
in the position of the memory correspondent to the current instruction. The adapt state creates the
32-bit data to write in the LUT in the following state. The first step is to determine which variable
(insert or remove) is set to 1. If the remove request is one, then it means that a specific opcode will
be removed. The opcode that needs to be removed is the opcode of the next instruction, which
is an input of the feature adapt module, sent by the data collector. After determining which byte
of the read data from the LUT is equal to the opcode of the next instruction, that same byte is
replaced by zeros. The adapt state defines the content of the 32 bits that are going to be written in
the LUT, and the write state enables the write and performs the replacement. On the other hand, if
the insert request is one instead of the remove request, then the new opcode of the next instruction
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will be added to the LUT, if it is still not there.
The Feature Adapt Logic module was also synthesized individually and the resources it uses
are shown in the Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Feature Adapt Logic Resources Usage
Resource Utilization Available Utilization (%)
Flip-Flops 173 437 200 0.04
LUT 124 218 600 0.06
BUFG 2 32 6.25
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Chapter 5
System Integration and Overall Results
This chapter presents the integration of the final system, with the JTAG TAP Controller included.
It characterizes how the system was implemented in the FPGA, describing the interface between
the processing system and the programmable logic as well as the experimental setup and commu-
nication with the computer. Finally, it concludes with the results of the complete system followed
by a brief discussion.
5.1 JTAG Synthesis
The final step before the integration of the complete system was the synthesis of the JTAG TAP
Controller. As previously mentioned, the OpenSPARC T2 was used to describe the typical JTAG
behavior.
The JTAG TAP Controller module consists of a 16-state finite state machine, shown in Fig-
ure 2.2. It contains signals that represent specific states, for instance, the update instruction register
and the shift data register. Both of these signals are sent to the detection system, through the Data
Collector. Furthermore, the TAP Controller has the responsibility of converting the JTAG input
bits (TDI, TMS and TRST) into instructions that are also provided to the Data Collector. More-
over, it generates the TDO, which is not relevant for the purpose of this work.
Likewise the other modules, the TAP Controller was synthesized individually and the re-
sources usage is shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: JTAG TAP Controller Resources Usage
Resource Utilization Available Utilization (%)
Flip-Flops 22 437 200 0.01
LUT 21 218 600 0.01
BUFG 1 32 3.12
One can see that the module is extremely small, when compared with the other modules and
with the complete board. Indeed, the block is composed only by some registers and standard D
flip-flops.
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Figure 5.1: Communication System Architecture
5.2 Interface and Communication System
As already pointed out in section 4.1, the processor of the FPGA runs Linux and it is necessary to
establish the communication with the system, which is implemented as a co-processor.
The protocol used to connect the processor with the co-processors was the AMBA AXI, in-
troduced by ARM, whose Intellectual Property (IP) is included in Vivado Design Suite. AMBA,
which stands for Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture, is an on-chip interconnect specifi-
cation focused on the connection and management of functional blocks inside a System-On-Chip
(SoC). There are 5 AMBA protocol specifications and the AXI (Advanced eXtensible Interface),
which is defined in the third specification, targets high performance and is widely used in ARM
Cortex-A processors.
Figure 5.1 shows the architecture of the communication system, composed by four blocks.
The bottom left block represents the ARM processor, which runs with a frequency of 666 MHz,
while the top left block contains the reset distribution logic, which is needed to propagate the sig-
nal through all the blocks. The module in the middle of the architecture is the AXI Interconnect
responsible by connecting the registers of the processor with the registers of the slave core. The
frequency of the AXI Interconnect is 50 MHz. Finally, the block on the right, called complete-
board is the implemented system, which includes the entire detection system and the JTAG TAP
Controller. In order to be able to communicate with the processor through the AXI interface, after
the HDL implementation of the modules, the system was packaged as an AXI slave core, whose
interface is a set of user-defined 32-bit registers. Accordingly, it was necessary to ensure that the
inputs could be read from those registers and the final outputs written in the same registers. These
reading and writing mechanisms will be explained in the next section.
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5.3 Experimental Setup and Synchronization
As mentioned before, the inputs and the outputs need to be read and written in the slave registers.
Since the registers are addressable on the processor side, it was developed a C program responsible
for this interaction with the registers. In fact, two different C programs were elaborated: one for the
implementation of the sequential and parallel classifiers and another for the final implementation
of the complete system.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Linux of the ARM processor is not a real time
operating system. As a result, the synchronization between the processor and the system’s slave
core needs to be done using flags.
5.3.1 Classifier Implementation
The AXI Interface for the FPGA implementation of the classifier uses three registers of the set of
user-defined 32-bit registers mentioned in section 5.2.
From these three registers, two are used by the inputs of the classifier, which correspond to the
8 features (that represent a total of 42 bits), the Update Instruction Register signal that is used to
start a classification and an extra flag that was created to address the mentioned synchronization
problem, called read_done, which indicates that the final outputs were successfully read.
The other register is used for the final outputs, which are the classification and the flag that
indicates the classification is complete. A new output was defined in other to compare both im-
plementations of the classifier, the sequential and parallel. This output counts the number of clock
cycles that a specific classification took.
Hence, the C program developed for interaction with the slave registers for the implementation
of the classifier has a pointer to the base address of the first register. From this first register,
the other registers are accessible with some pointer arithmetic and the 8 features are written in
the correspondent positions. Then, the Update Instruction Register signal is set to one and the
program enters in a loop until it reads a 1 in the flag, indicating that the classification is completed.
Afterwards, it just reads the value of the final classification and the number of clock cycles and
prints them on the screen. Finally, the C program sends the acknowledge of the outputs and the
classifier waits for new features to classify.
5.3.2 System Implementation
Likewise in the implementation of the classifier, the AXI Interface for the FPGA implementa-
tion of the complete system also uses three registers of the set of user-defined 32-bit registers.
Nevertheless, it includes other components that are going to be described.
However, in this implementation two of the registers are used for the outputs and just one for
the inputs. The inputs are the reset, the start and the finish. These last two are special flags needed
for the synchronization. The reset is either the reset from the AXI Interface or a reset that is sent
by the C program. The outputs are the final alert, the counter of the alerts and two extra flags for
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synchronization. One is called got_reset and it acknowledges the reception of the reset sent by
the C program while the other is called out and indicates the end of the set of instructions under
evaluation. In fact, the system has more inputs and outputs, that are going to be described in the
next section, but the ones mentioned in this section are the inputs and outputs used in the AXI
Interface.
Hence, the C program starts by sending a reset signal, and waits for the response of the system
through the got_reset flag. Then, the start is set to one and the system begins the classification of
the entire set of instructions, until the out flag indicates the set is over. Afterwards, the finish is set
to one and the value of the counter of the alerts is read. The execution time is also determined in
the C program and shown in the end.
One component present in the interface is a Mixed-Mode Clock Managers (MMCM) that
works as a clock multiplier and divider. The AXI clock was used as the base clock to avoid clock
skew between the two or more clocks. The clock frequencies generated by this MMCM will be
presented along with the complete system results.
5.4 Complete System Results
After the individual synthesis of each module, they were placed all together within a top module
composed by two sub-modules, one for the JTAG TAP Controller and another as a top module for
the whole detection system, which includes the classifier, the LUT, the feature adapt logic and the
data collector.
The classifier that was included in the final system was undoubtedly the parallel classifier due
to its much better performance concerning time. The sequential classifier was a first approach
which did not take into account the timing constraints of the entire system and consequently the
frequency of the Update Instruction Register signal, which represents a new classification should
be started.
In order to test properly the implementation, several sets of instructions, normal and illegiti-
mate, were provided by the authors. The instructions were initially in files .instr and two Python
programs were used in order to convert them to testbenches (.v) and to .bit files. The testbenches
were used in Vivado Design Suite to simulate the system while the .bit files were created for the
FPGA implementation. There are 3 .bit files per instruction, one for each input (TDI, TMS and
TRST). These 3 inputs were stored in 3 external memories, one for each input, and were applied to
the JTAG TAP Controller module. Hence, the resources usage of the final implementation depends
on the size of the set of instructions as well as the execution time.
Besides the TDI, TMS and TRST that are stored in memories, the top module has the reset,
start, finish and two different clocks as inputs. The clocks, as mentioned, are generated by the
Mixed-Mode Clock Managers that uses the AXI Interface clock of 50 MHz as the base clock. A
clock of 30 MHz is generated for the JTAG TAP Controller, which is a normal JTAG frequency,
while the detection system works with a clock frequency of 150 MHz. The fact that the detection
system is running with a frequency 5 times higher than the JTAG ensures the meeting of the timing
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Figure 5.2: Global Control Finite State Machine
constraints, imposed by the Update Instruction Register signal. It is not possible to determine the
number of clock cycles needed for one classification since it depends on the instruction, but as
shown in section 4.2.5 it can take 20/30 clock cycles. Although it is not common, the worst case
scenario regarding the Update Instruction Register could be 10/12 clock cycles, which means that
a faster clock for the classifier is definitely needed.
The outputs of the system’s top module, as mentioned in the previous section, are the out and
got_reset flags, the alert and the counter of alerts. It is important to note that this top module is
instantiated within the AXI Interface, in order to read the inputs from the registers, apply them to
the module and write the final outputs in the registers.
The final system has a global finite state machine (FSM) with 3 states, shown in Figure 5.2 to
control the reading of the inputs from the external memories and to assign the out flag.
The system stays in the initial state until the start is sent by the C program. Once the start is
active, it starts reading the TDI, TMS and TRST from the correspondent memories, with the clock
frequency of the JTAG TAP Controller. While in this state, both the detection system and TAP
Controller are working. When the end of the instruction set is reached (after reading the last bit of
TDI, TMS and TRST), which depends on the size of the set of instructions, the FSM moves to the
final state and the out flag is set to one. In this state, the C program can already read the flag and
end the execution. Once it ends the loop, it sends the finish flag, and the FSM goes to the initial
state to wait for a new set of instructions.
5.4.1 Resources Usage
The resources usage of the complete system, including the AXI Interface and the MMCM, is
shown in table 5.2. One can see that the final implementation is extremely small compared to the
entire board. In order to give a better visualization of the space, Figure 5.3 shows the FPGA board
with the implemented design represented by the blue dots. However, neither the figure nor the
table include the memories that store the instruction bits, since they depend from set to set.
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Table 5.2: Complete System Resources Usage
Resource Utilization Available Utilization (%)
Flip-Flops 1 492 437 200 0.34
LUT 5 297 218 600 2.42
Memory LUT 3 272 70 400 4.65
BUFG 3 32 9.38
MMCM 1 8 12.50
5.4.2 Execution Time
The execution time depends on the size of the set of instructions. However, in section 4.2.5 two
different sets of input features were applied to both classifiers. In these sets, the parallel classifier
took 22 and 28 clock cycles for the classification. With the clock frequency of 150 MHz, which is
the frequency that the classifier is running in the final system, these two classifications would take
approximately 147 and 187 nanoseconds, respectively. In fact, there are instructions that can take
more or less than the number of clock cycles presented, since these are just examples.
Nevertheless, in the final system, the execution time depends on the frequency of the JTAG,
since it is the responsible of triggering new instructions. Hence, it is not related with the frequency
of the detection system, assuming that all the classifications are done within the time.
Four different clock frequencies (12.5, 25, 30 and 42 MHz) for the JTAG TAP Controller
module were tested for four sets of instructions, two illegitimate and two normal, and the execution
times were determined. Table 5.3 shows these times, in microseconds. These times include the
sending of a reset pulse in the beginning of the execution, and also the waiting time of the response
to the reset pulse, in order to know that the reset was read and executed.
Table 5.3: Execution Times in microseconds for different clock frequencies
Instruction Sets JTAG Frequencies (MHz)
12.5 25 30 42
Set 1 - Normal - Boundary Scan 2 003 1 006 840 603
Set 2 - Normal - CREG Read 488 248 209 152
Set 3 - Illegitimate - eFUSE 471 240 202 147
Set 4 - Illegitimate - Clock Manipulation 554 282 236 172
The four sets that were used were provided by the authors and are based in the Test Con-
trol Unit (TCU) of the OpenSPARC T2 [3]. The first set represents the normal Boundary Scan
operation that is used in manufacturing test, while the set 2 indicates read operations to Control
Registers (CREG). Control Registers are internal registers of the computer system that can control
the computer configurations and settings. The set number 3 and 4 represent two possible attacks.
Set 3 is related with eFUSE, which is a technology that allows dynamic real-time reprogramming
of computer chips whose interface for read and write is provided by JTAG. Finally, set number 4
is about clock manipulations. The JTAG provides an interface capable of manipulating the clock
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Figure 5.3: FPGA with Implemented Design
of a chip, including for instance, stop the clock, restart it, count the clock in debug mode, and
many other operations. As stated, the execution time depends on the size of each instruction set.
Thus, the sizes in number of instructions and bits per input (TDI, TMS and TRST) are shown in
Table 5.4. The number of bits per input is shown because the number of instructions does not give
an idea on the size of each set. For instance, the Boundary Scan set is the biggest set, in spite of
having just one instruction (Boundary Scan is selected by EXTEST instruction).
Table 5.4: Number of instructions and bits per input for each instruction set
Instruction Sets Number ofInstructions
Number of Bits
Per Input
Set 1 - Normal - Boundary Scan 1 24 924
Set 2 - Normal - CREG Read 66 5 980
Set 3 - Illegitimate - eFUSE 89 5 770
Set 4 - Illegitimate - Clock Manipulation 129 6 813
Analyzing both tables 5.3 and 5.4, it is possible to confirm that indeed, the execution times
are very small concerning the total number of bits, and the system has an excellent timing perfor-
mance.
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5.4.3 Accuracy and Escape Rate
The accuracy and the escape rate for each set of the four that were tested are shown in Table 5.5.
This method has the drawback of not dealing with imbalanced data sets. Thus, it is necessary to
assume that in the sets that represent an attack, all the predictions were supposed to be 1, and in
contrast, in sets that represent normal actions all the predictions were supposed to be 0. Hence,
the True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Negative (FN) and False Positive (FP) were
counted. TP represent the number of illegitimate actions that were detected successfully and TN
is the number of normal actions that were also detected. On the contrary, FN is the number of
illegitimate actions that were not seen and FP represent the number of normal actions that were
classified as illegitimate actions. Moreover, using these numbers, the Accuracy and Escape Rate
were determined using equations 5.1 and 5.2. The accuracy is the fraction of correct predictions
out of all predictions while the escape rate is the fraction of attacks that escape detection out of all
attacks.
Accuracy =
T P+T N
T P+T N +FN +FP
(5.1)
Escape Rate =
FN
T P+FN
(5.2)
Table 5.5: Accuracy and Escape Rate
Instruction Sets TP TN FN FP Accuracy Escape Rate
Set 1 - Normal - Boundary Scan - 36 - 0 100 % -
Set 2 - Normal - CREG Read - 65 - 1 98.48 % -
Set 3 - Illegitimate - eFUSE 88 - 2 - 97.78 % 2.22%
Set 4 - Illegitimate - Clock Manipulation 241 - 5 - 97.97 % 2.03 %
Total 329 101 7 1 98.17 % 2.08 %
One can see that these results are extremely good, however they just give an idea of the per-
formance of the system, and can not be assumed as the final accuracy. These accuracy and escape
rate values are for these four specific sets of instructions.
5.4.4 Power Consumption
The total power consumption of the system was estimated using the Vivado Design Suite post-
implementation analysis and is shown in Table 5.6. Four different power results were obtained for
four different clock frequencies of the detection system: 60, 90, 120 and 150 MHz. The frequency
of the JTAG TAP Controller was kept at 30 MHz in all these 4 implementations. For a better
visualization, these values are also plotted in Figure 5.4.
Furthermore, it is shown in Figure 5.5 the distribution of the power. It can be seen that the
dynamic power increases slightly with the increase of the clock frequency. This increase can be
noticed in the Clocks and MMCM components, while the Logic and Signals stay constant.
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Table 5.6: Power consumption for 4 different clock frequencies
Detection System
Frequencies (MHz) Total Power (W)
60 1.929
90 1.936
120 1.956
150 1.957
In fact, the power of the implementation is assumed to be just the four components that are
shown inside the dynamic power: clocks, signals, logic and MMCM. These components represent
the programmable logic, and if the four values are summed and this sum subtracted to the value
of the dynamic power it is possible to conclude that the resultant value is always constant between
the four implementations, approximately 1.567 W, which is assumed to be the dynamic power
consumption of the processing system of the board.
Moreover, the system’s IP Core was synthesized without the other components of the design
(Processing System, AXI Interface) and the value obtained was always 0.245 W. Thus, this value
can represent the static power consumption of the programmable logic of the Zynq-7000 ZC706
board.
Hence, Table 5.7 shows the power that comes from the Processing System and Programmable
Logic. Following what was mentioned before, this last value is composed by the 0.245 W and the
sum of the four components.
Table 5.7: Processing System and Programmable Logic Powers (W) for different frequencies
Detection System
Frequencies (MHz)
Processing System
Power (W)
Programmable Logic
Power (W)
60 1.567 0.362
90 1.566 0.370
120 1.566 0.390
150 1.567 0.390
5.5 Discussion
Analyzing all the results presented in this section, it is possible to admit that the complete system
is fast and small in area. In fact, as mentioned, the speed only depends on the JTAG frequency, but
besides that, a frequency of 150 MHz for the detection system could also be achieved, allowing
the possibility of not only make all the predictions within the time, but also increase the clock
frequency of the JTAG, if desired, consequently decreasing the execution time.
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Figure 5.4: Power vs. Frequency
The accuracy and escape rate results give an idea of the performance of the system but as
referred, they can not be assumed as final results. The sets are assumed to be balanced and in
reality they are not. However, the results obtained show that the system is extremely accurate.
Moreover, the system consumes a very reduced power, since the Programmable Logic power,
in all those four frequencies tested can achieve a maximum of 390 mW, where 245 mW is always
present since it corresponds to static power.
5.5 Discussion 55
(a) 60 MHz (b) 90 MHz
(c) 120 MHz (d) 150 MHz
Figure 5.5: Power Consumption and Distribution for 60, 90, 120 and 150 MHz
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter presents the final conclusions of this work, how the proposed objectives were achieved
and some drawbacks of the current implementation as well. Moreover, it describes what can be
done in the future to improve the system and integrate it in real systems.
6.1 Conclusions
The final goal of this work was to have the complete security system working properly in a Xilinx
Zynq-7000 All Programmable SoC ZC706. This complete system includes the random forest
classifier which consisted in the main focus of the work, and three more important modules: the
data collector, the feature adapt logic and a memory that stores information about the transitions
between the instructions. Moreover, the system would need to be capable of interacting with the
JTAG, since it is a security system that tracks the activity in this important and widely used testing
and debugging port. Thus, a JTAG TAP Controller module of the OpenSPARC T2 was used and
included in the project to describe the typical behavior of the JTAG.
Being motivated by the fact that there are no hardware implementations of security systems
that are based on Machine Learning, the main challenge of the work would be the need of a fast
system that could be able to perform all the classifications within the time.
The objectives proposed were accomplished successfully and the entire system was simulated,
synthesized and implemented on the board. A clock frequency of 150 MHz for the detection
system could be achieved, and several frequencies for the JTAG TAP Controller were tested. The
area and resources usage of the final implementation are extremely reduced as well as the power
consumption which is just 390 mW for the Programmable Logic part at the highest frequency.
The execution times obtained depend on the size of the instruction set that is being classified, and
different instructions have different lengths. However, analyzing the sizes of the sets in number of
bits, it is possible to conclude that the execution times are small, since 30 MHz is a normal JTAG
frequency.
Therefore, this work represents, as far as the author knows, the first hardware implementation
of a security system based on Machine Learning.
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6.2 Future Work
Although this work is working properly in the FPGA and achieved all the proposed objectives, it
was designed as a proof of concept since it is, as referred, the first hardware implementation of a
machine-learning based security system.
Therefore, it has drawbacks. The major drawback of the implementation is the fact that the
instruction sets are stored in memories and not being supplied externally. However, that can be
a future step to improve this work, which is perfectly feasible but requires an extremely well
done synchronization between the clock frequency of the inputs (JTAG) and the frequency of the
detection system.
Moreover, the decision trees of the forest can always be improved, in terms of training or
hardware implementation. Either by training them with a better training set, or by pipelining each
tree, having for instance, a node for each level of the tree, instead of an universal node as is being
used. This last suggestion would bring more hardware complexity but the speed of the detection
system could be increased.
Finally, future work can also be the implementation of this system in an ASIC (Application-
Specific Integrated Circuit). ASICs gives design flexibility which consequently gives opportunity
for speed optimizations. Also, they can be optimized for required low power, since there are
several techniques that allow the achievement of the target power, such as clock gating, power
gating, etc. Furthermore, ASICs also have advantages in cost.
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